Nihar R Nayak
Unlike the 2014 general elections of India, the 2019 drew much international attention ever since the Election Commission announced the seven-phase polls on March 10, just less than one month after the Pulwama suicide attack in Jammu and Kashmir and 12 days after India’s air strike on terrorist training camps in Balakot, Pakistan. Despite being aware of the involvement of a Pakistani based terrorist organization in the Pulwama attack; many western media accused BJP led government of bringing two nuclear powered countries closer to a conflict. Earlier, in June 2017, New Delhi had challenged Chinese military aggression in the Dokalam region near India-Bhutan tri-junction. Moreover, Prime Minister Modi led NDA-I also attracted international attention for adopting an outward looking foreign policy that included India’s neighborhood first policy, reservations against joining the BRI, Wuhan summit between PM Modi and Xi Jiping, campaigning against international terrorism, decision over SAARC and BIMSTEC, besides India’s proactive role in international issues and major policy initiatives at home.
Nepali media on India elections
In fact, during the election campaigning, which started on April 11, a large number of opinion pieces, editorials and television debates took place in India’s neighboring countries in general and Nepal in particular about India’s elections and foreign policy of the new government. The debate was intensified further in response to releasing of the exit poll assessments and declaration of the final results on May 23, which went in favor of the BJP. Some of the articles published by Nepali writers like ‘Why Nepal Is Keenly Watching India Elections’, ‘At ground zero in India’s election heartland’, ‘Indian elections, South Asian concerns’, etc, argued that Nepal has been closely observing the elections due to friendly and historical relations between the two countries, India’s reservations on the 2015 Constitution and its silence over Madhesi border blockade for six months, promoting BBIN and BIMSTEC against SAARC, India’s silence on exchange of old Indian currency in post demonetization period, delay in accepting EPG report, India’s reservations on BRI (which Nepal signed in 2017) and perception about BJP sister organization’s sympathy towards revival of Hindu rashtra in Nepal.
Perceived assertive FP
As election were results declared and the BJP and its allies secured 353 seats out of 542 Lok Sabha seats, a large number of Nepali media, especially The Kathmandu Post and Nepali Times argued in their articles that the BJP led NDA-II might adopt ‘assertive neighborhood policy,’ including towards Nepal. The word ‘assertive’ has both positive and negative connotations. Interestingly, the word is presented in negative light while analyzing India’s new foreign policy. The assumptions about new foreign policy of India are mere perception than reality. India cannot afford to have an assertive policy towards its smaller neighbors due to following reasons:
First, other than adhering to international norms, diplomatically, India is considered as one of the responsible nations. Its global image has changed over a period of time due to its position on global politics, civil rights, security, social and economic issues. Economically, it is again considered as an influential power and an emerging economic power in Asia. With this positive global image, India might not afford to pursue any policy which would affect its image.
Second, in its 70 years of diplomatic history, India has never shown any ‘territorial interest (s)’ towards its smaller neighboring countries. It has always emphasized resolving the outstanding border related issues with Nepal by mutual negotiations through diplomatic channel. Rather, India has been promoting democracy and is willing to work with its neighbor as an equal development partner.
Third, the perception about continuation of pro-Madhesi policy of the NDA-II is untrue. The 6-months border blockade by the Madhesi parties and India’s silence on that had huge negative impact on India’s image at global, regional and bilateral level. India perhaps realized the same and corrected course by taking unilateral initiative to reach out to the first democratically elected government under the new Constitution in Kathmandu. India respected the popular mandate and the message was sent to Kathmandu by sending external affairs minister Sushma Swaraj on February 2, 2018 there. Since then PM Modi visited Nepal twice and had one-on-one meeting with PM Oli on bilateral and regional issues.
Four, from India’s point of view, given the strategic location of Nepal, India cannot pursue community based and sub-regional (Madhesi/Terai centric) policy towards Nepal. Demographically, Terai is not a monolithic region. Out of total Nepali population, 51 percent live in Terai and again of that 19 percent are Madhesi (a group of castes, which have similarities with people living in Bihar and Uttar Pradesh of India) [1]. Even Tharus (a dominant ethnic group in Terai) and Muslims do not identify themselves as Madhesis. They prefer to identify themselves as Teraian (geographically). Factually, in case India pursues Madhesi centric (both geographical and community basis) foreign policy towards Nepal then India loses support and sympathy of roughly 80 percent of Nepali population. That gives ample space to China, Pakistan and other external forces to maneuver effectively in the Himalayan region. Therefore, India is in favor of a pan-Nepal policy.
Five, India has specific reservations on the BRI. But so far, it has not asked its smaller neighbors to support on this issue. The Nepali perception of India’s aggressive response to BRI projects in Nepal is unsubstantial. India is aware of Chinese economic prowess and global vision. India is also aware about its level of influence in South Asia. Any kind of competition with China will certainly benefit a third country. India understands that China will not invest beyond a limit in the Himalayas without any profit. Therefore, the new Indian approach towards BRI in the Himalayan region or in South Asia could be to identify its core strategic areas and invest or support annual development assistance to Nepal and others accordingly.
Sixth, despite India being a friendly neighbor, its influence in the internal issues of Nepal could be always limited. There was a time; India had expected Nepal to consult on foreign, economic and security matters. In 21st century with resurgence of communication and military technology, the traditional relationships between countries have changed drastically. Under this debate, any internal changes in Nepal could be people’s driven and under the guidance of the new Constitution. Without majority consent and support of the ruling party, no foreign power can alter the basic principles of Nepali Constitution. In case, if Nepal wants to switch to a Hindu rashtra that would be people driven. Some Indian Hindu group (s) could express their sympathy for the same. That should not be treated as India’s policy. Being a secular country, India cannot make any suggestions to Nepal in this regard officially.
FP of new government
Since the same party under the same Prime Minister will continue in New Delhi, the NDA-II foreign policy on neighborhood will be broadly guided by ‘neighbourhood first policy’ and ‘Sabka Sath Sabka Vikash’. On May 25, PM Modi upgraded this slogan by adding ‘Sabka Viswas’ (wining confidence of everyone). The same will be applying in case of neigbourhood policy to wining the confidence of smaller countries to a newer height. The new government will continue its policy of South Asia as shared zone of prosperity, which synchronizes with Nepali PM’s vision of “Samriddha Nepal, Sukhi Nepal”. The priority of the NDA-II would also be to address those issues that have been contributing to the negative images of India in its neighborhood.
For an average Hill castes of Nepal, the word Madhesi is interpreted as a regional community identity. However, the fact is that the word ‘Madhesi’ is derived from the word ‘Madhyadesh’. It is a geographical identity, not a caste identity. These caste groups have been living in that region for centuries. They got separated due to demarcation of political boundaries between British India and Nepal under the Sagauli treaty in 1816. As a result, these caste groups are now found both in Nepal and India side like any other border communities.
